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Abstract:
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Article 81 of the European Union Treaty (Article 81) prohibits " . . . agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practises which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market…".I

Article 81 focuses on the analysis of the competitive behaviour of a Joint Venture
participant. Joint Ventures that fail to satisfy the threshold of the European
Commission’s Merger Regulation (ECMR) due to the factors that either they are not
fully-functional in nature or lack a community dimension, are analysed under Article
81.II

Co-operative Joint Ventures can be classified in to two broad categories. One, which
is governed by merger control regulation viz. Co-operative full-function Joint
Ventures and the other regulated under Article 81 viz. Co-operative non-full-function
Joint Ventures. The following pages will deal with the scope of Joint Ventures (JV)
regulated by Article 81.

Application of Article 81 to Joint Venture

The European Commission’s (Commission) notice on co-operative and concentrative
JVs describes joint ventures as “undertakings controlled by two more other
undertakings”III.

In other words, any arrangement between two undertakings for commercial purposes
can be termed as Joint Venture. Joint Ventures as defined by Faull & Nikpay I

http://www.eierskapstilsynet.no/rapporter/artikler/eucommergercases.doc, dt. 04-05-03

II

Antitrust Scrutiny of Telecommunications Mergers, Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances - A Shift From

Regulation to Enforcement By Kevin R. Sullivan, Jeffrey S. Spigel and David A. Cohen,
http://www.kslaw.com/library/articles.asp?16, dt. 04-05-03.
III

The EC law of competition Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay pg. 348; Oxford University Press, 1999. The chapter was

written by F.Enrique Gonzalez Diaz, Dan Kirk, Francisco Perez and Cecile Verkleij
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“agreements by which two or more independent undertakings proceed to the partial
integration of their business operations, which are put under joint control in order to
achieve some commercial goal”IV. While discussing Joint Ventures, it is further
important to analyse the antitrust consequences of these Joint Ventures. Joint
Ventures give rise to new competitive force in the market. This may further result in
anti-competitive spill-over effects.

“Article 81 of the EC Treaty has three elements:
Article 81(1) prohibits certain restrictive agreements and conduct, which may affect
trade between EC member states. A number of examples of prohibited arrangements
are expressly identified in the text of Article 81, including price fixing, market
sharing, and production quotas. This list is non-exhaustive and other types of anticompetitive behaviour may be caught by the prohibition;
Article 81(2) provides that restrictive agreements falling within the scope of the
prohibition are automatically void;
Article 81(3) allows the Commission to grant individual exemptions in respect of
agreements, which satisfy specified criteria.”V

Commission views that in the case of vertical agreements (i.e. agreements between
firms at different levels of supply) an arrangement may be deemed to have no
appreciable effects if the combined market share of the participants is less than 10%.
In the case of horizontal agreements (i.e. agreements between competitors) an
arrangement may be deemed to have no appreciable effects if the combined market
share of the participants is less than 5%. The Commission is of the view that certain
types of agreement, for example agreements for fixing of prices or production quotas
or those forming part of a network of similar agreements, may be found to have
appreciable effects even where the market shares fall below these thresholds. On the
other hand, an agreement may be found to have no appreciable effects where these
thresholds are exceeded, depending on the particular market structure and
conditions.VI
IV

V

VI

See note 3
http://www.legal500.com/devs/eu/cp/eucp_001.htm, dt. 04-05- 03
http://www.legal500.com/devs/eu/cp/eucp_001.htm, dt. 04-05- 03
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The GEC-Weir Sodium Circulators decision of 21st November 1977 describes the
competitive risks associated with the formation of a Joint Venture under Article 81. In
it’s finding Commission stated that: setting up of a Joint Venture between two
undertakings, which prior to forming a Joint Venture were potential competitors in the
same field of activity, is considered to be a restriction of competition due to
replacement of two undertakings by one. The collusive effect, either in the Joint
Venture market or related one where the parents are in competition, is also a
restriction to competition as such. In such circumstances there will not be any
competition within the parent and Joint Venture Company. In case the Joint Venture
is vertically related to the parent companies, the position of the third parties will be
affected, as Joint Venture will be preferred as a source of supply, producing a
foreclosure effect restrictive of competitionVII.

Under Article 81, the Commission assesses, wherever the parent companies and Joint
Venture Company are in vertical relationship, the possible foreclosure effect will be
produced.
Role of Potential Competition

The existence of potential competition between the parent companies is determined
by the Commission on the presumption relating to the previous activities, expertise
and their financial resources. In the thirteenth report on the competition policy, to
evaluate whether the formation of a JV in production field restricts potential
competition, the Commission has set out a checklist of questions:
1. Input of the Joint Venture: Does the investment exceed the financing capacity
and whether the parent companies have technical know-how and source of
input products.
2. Production of the Joint Venture: This involves partner’s familiarity with the
process technology and access to production facilities.

VII

Refer to: note 3 pg. 353-354
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3. Sales by the Joint Venture: Would it be possible for any of the partners to
manufacture the product on its own and whether the distribution channel is
accessible by parent companies for the Joint Venture product.
4. Risk factor: Capacity of each partner to take financial and technical risk
associated with the production operation. VIII
Spill-over Effects

“A JV also can lead to anti-competitive effects in markets ancillary to the JV market,
where the JV partners may either continue to compete or may be potential
competitors. Such concerns commonly stem from the partners' access to competitively
sensitive information through the JV. These concerns can be addressed through
various safeguards, thereby mitigating any potential anti-competitive spill-over
effects.”IX

The Commission automatically applies Article 81(1) to a Joint Venture between
competitors and to aggregate their market share in the assessment. Exxon/Shell
decision of 1994, discusses the co-ordination effect in more detail. Joint Venture
Company ‘Cipen’, used to produce certain grade of polythene (PE) in Europe, it was
decided that the product would be exclusively supplied to the parent companies, and
the parent companies would in turn sell PE to the final consumers. The parents
companies held 20 percent of EU production capacity and Joint Venture represented
17 per cent of this combined capacity. The Commission concluded that, “the parents
would be likely to co-ordinate their behaviour on the EU market for these grades of
PE through the Joint Venture. Therefore the agreement fell under Article 81(1)”X.

Faull and Nikpay further commented, “It is not just the relative importance of Joint
Venture to the parents activities on the market that will determine whether they will
VIII

IX

Refer to: note 3 pg. 357.

Antitrust Scrutiny of Telecommunications Mergers, Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances - A Shift From

Regulation to Enforcement By Kevin R. Sullivan, Jeffrey S. Spigel and David A. Cohen,
http://www.kslaw.com/library/articles.asp?16, dt. 04-05-03.
X

Refer to: note 3 pg. 360-361.
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co-ordinate their behaviour, the greater the parent combined market share on the
market the stronger the incentive there is for them to co-ordinate and hence a smaller
Joint Venture can be a source of anti-competitive co-ordination”.XI

The issues that are supposed to be addressed while assessing the applicability of
Article 81 are (1) the restriction of actual or potential competition on parties to the
Joint Venture (2) the effect on third parties and; (3) network effect.XII

The Commission stand, as to take an economic analysis of the incentives on the
parents to co-ordinate their behaviour and effects, was reconfirmed in the decision of
European Night Services.XIII The court upheld the earlier decision, stating that the
Commission had not taken sufficient economic reasoning in its original decision that
the agreements fell under Article 81(1).XIV

The possible link of a Joint Venture with a downstream market was dealt in Philips /
Osram decision of 1994. The Joint Venture was to manufacture lead glass tubing for
lamps. The case was assessed under Article 81 because the parties had 65 per cent of
the EEA capacity for producing lead glass. Parties also produced final lamps and were
also competitors in most segments of downstream market. The costing of lead glass
tubing was only 0.67 per cent of the lamp. Here the Commission concluded that
’given the very small importance on lead glass on the manufacturing cost of lamps,
such standardisation is not considered relevant enough as to constitute a restriction of
competition’. XV

XI

Refer to: note 3 pg. 361.

XII

EC Competition Law, Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, pg.825. Oxford press 2001

XIII

Joined cases T-373/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94 European Night Services Ltd (ENS), judgement of

15 Sept 1998. Also refer to- The EC law of competition by Jonathan Faull, Ali Nikpay. Pg. 361; Oxford University
Press, 1999. The chapter was written by F.Enrique Gonzalez Diaz, Dan Kirk, Francisco Perez and Cecile Verkleij.
XIV

XV

Refer to: note 3 pg. 361.
Refer to: note 3, pg. 361.
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Network Effects

The Commission is also concerned, when in a concentrated market a single
technology provider may get into Joint Venture with different partners and may deter
them from competing with each other. While discussing this kind of a network effect
or network of joint ventures, in Optical Fibres case, the Commission found that each
individual joint venture did not restrict competition, since parties contributed
complimentary technologies.XVI The Commission further stated that “a network of
Joint Ventures does not infringe Article 81(1) when provider of a technology has
substantial interest and control over each Joint Venture and the market is
oligopolistic. Its theory is that Corning might use the control over one Joint Venture
to prevent its expansion in order to protect one of the others.”XVII

An express restriction of competition between the parents of a Joint Venture, resulting
into fixing of prices or share markets would be regulated under Article 81(1).

While giving its views on the joint sales organisations, the Commission cleared a joint
sales organisation as not having appreciable effects in SAFCO whereby small markets
of preserve were able to penetrate the German market whereby they met substantial
competition.XVIII

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is of the view that, with small market share,
organisations involved in co-operative buying and selling do not infringe Article
81(1). In Korah’s views, a joint sales organisation cannot restrict production to raise
price unless the parties accept restrictions on production or agree to share prices.XIX

In another case, P&O/Stena, P&O ferries and Stena lines formed a Joint Venture for
providing channel ferry services across Short French Sea and the Belgian Straight.
Two markets involved were passenger services and freight services. The Joint
XVI

EC Competition Law and Practice, Valentine Korah, pg.333. Hart Publishing, 2000

XVII

Refer to: note 16, pg.334.

XVIII

XIX

Refer to: note 16, pg.331.

Refer to: note 16, pg.332.
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Venture was held under Article 81(1) because parties were actual competitors. After
analysis it was concluded that the Joint Venture company and Eurotunnel are likely to
compete rather than to act in parallel to raise prices.XX

In the year 1993, British Telecom (BT) and MCI Communications Corp. (MCI)
announced a $US 4.3 billion global alliance. The venture comprised two transactions(1)

BT would acquire a 20 percent stake in MCI for $US 4.3 billion, thereby
making BT, MCI's largest shareholder.

(2)

BT and MCI would create a new JV - Concert, to which each company
contributed certain businesses.

The

Concert

would

pursue

the

companies'

goal

of

providing

global

telecommunications services to multinational customers. As part of the alliance MCI
would market Concert services in America, while BT would market Concert in the
rest of the world. At the time when transaction was announced, BT was the world's
fourth largest telecommunication services provider with dominant position in local
and long distance services in United Kingdom. MCI was the second largest long
distance

Company in

the

United

States,

and

the

world's

fifth

largest

telecommunications carrier. The EC found the Concert "cooperative" JV to restrict
competition because BT and MCI were potential competitors in the overall market for
telecommunications, as well as in the value added global services segment in which
Concert would participate.XXI In the case of BT/MCI Joint Venture, the Commission
granted exemption on the condition that users in the European Economic Area (EEA)
may also avail services through MCI in addition to incumbent BT. This would be
valid even during the 5-year agreement period under which both were under
obligation to not to provide services in each others geographical territory.XXII

XX

Refer to: EC Competition Law, Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, pg.827-829. Oxford press 2001

XXI

XXII

Refer to note 9.
EC Competition Law and the new economy of Information Technology, by Prof Steve Anderman, pg30. Draft

paper, 23/10/02, University of Essex.
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In the ATLASXXIII case the Commission dealt with Joint Venture between a French
and a German national telcom operators to provide a range of complex
communication package.XXIV France Télécom ("FT") and Deutsche Telekom ("DT")
proposed to purchase $US4billion of Sprint Corporation’s (Sprint) stock and form a
global telecommunications venture, known as Global One. The venture would provide
not only voice but also data transmission and other enhanced telecommunications
services. As part of the transaction DT and FT would separately enter into a JV Atlas, for provision of telecommunications services in the EU. Atlas would then serve
as the vehicle for FT and DT's JV with Sprint. DT and FT were the world's second
and fourth largest telecommunications providers, respectively; as well as the two
largest European telecommunications firms. They also at that time, were the
monopoly telephone service providers in their respective home countries. In the U.S.,
Sprint was the third largest long distance carrier after AT&T and MCI.XXV The
Commission granted an exemption to the Joint Venture despite the substantial
elimination of the competition between the parents. The Commission was of the view
that consumers would benefit from the improved technology and this would enable
better technical harmonisation.XXVI

In another case of Eirpage, the Commission granted an exemption to a Joint Venture
agreement between Bord Telecom Eireann (BTE) and Motorola Ireland Ltd for
creation and operation of National paging system. It is evident from the above
decisions and cases that the Commissions concern is only to prevent early leadership
resulting into premature foreclosure since this would prevent competition and
innovation of new technologies.

To grant an exemption under Article 81(3), the Commission has to show that the
agreement does not impose on the undertaking concerned restrictions, which are not

XXIII

[1996] OJ L239/29, [1997] 4 CMLR 89.

XXIV

Refer to: note 20, pg.829.

XXV

XXVI

Refer to note 9.
Refer to: note 24.
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indispensable to the attainment of objectives such as improvement of production or
distribution of goods.XXVII
Application of Article 81 to Research and Development Agreements

The Commission considers that, in order to assess the applicability of Article 81(1), it
is not only sufficient to envisage the competition between parties, but it is also
necessary to consider whether an R&D agreement is likely to affect competition to
such an extent that negative effects can be expected. To assess whether an R&D is
likely to cause such a negative effect on the market, the economic context must be
considered, taking into account the nature of the agreement and the party’s market
power. The purpose behind the cooperation is an important factor in determining
whether an R&D agreement per se has any anti-competitive effect. If the true object
of an agreement is not R&D but the creation of a disguised cartel (i.e. otherwise
prohibited price fixing), output limitation or market allocation, it shall fall under
Article 81(1) and the same shall not be permitted. For e.g., the sharing of markets or
customers reduces the choice available to customers and leads to higher prices or
reduced output. Consequently, those forms of co-operation are almost always
prohibited.XXVIII Thus dealing with Research and Development Joint Ventures, if the
object of an agreement is to create disguised cartel, instead of R&D, it would fall
under Article 81(1) and Article 81(1) would apply. The guideline also say that Article
81(1) is not infringed merely because the parties have more than 25% market share
but if the parties position of the parties on the market becomes stronger.

“R&D agreements that cannot be assessed from the outset as clearly non-restrictive
may fall under Article 81(1) and have to be analysed by taking into consideration the
market-related criteria such as the market position of the parties, and other structural
factors. Different forms of cooperation in R&D may be assessed differently as regards
their acceptability under Article 81(3). That assessment very often depends on the

XXVII

XXVIII

Refer to: note 3, pg. 357.
http://firms.findlaw.com/KAYNAKLAR/affiliate5.htm, dt. 04-05-03
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stage in which the cooperation is carried out. Pure R&D agreements, as explained
above, are most likely to be exempted.” XXIX

The Commissions policy towards potential competition is set out in Elopak / Metal
Box – Odin Decision. Elopak and Metal Box agreed to set up a Joint Venture, Odin, to
research develop and ultimately manufacture and distribute a new type of packaging.
The technology was new and involved contributions from both the parents. In
Commissions view, neither party in the short term would enter the market alone, as
such entry would require a knowledge of other party’s technology, which otherwise
for development requires time consuming investment. Therefore it was not regarded
as potential competition and Joint Venture did not fall within Article 81(1). Article
81(1) applies to agreements where parties are actual or potential competitors.XXX
Conclusion

The Joint Venture between two companies may unite their economic interests thus
facilitating restrictive arrangements or creation of anti competitive spill-over
effects.XXXI Joint Ventures where the parent companies are in actual competition or
are potential competitors are regulated under Article 81(1).

As pointed out by Professor Hawk, ‘ by applying Article 81(1) to the co-ordination of
the competitive behaviour of the parent companies and also to the pooling of activities
in the Joint Venture, the Commission was likely to treat the potential for efficiencies
created by co-operated full function Joint Venture more harshly than the equivalent
potential for efficiencies stemming from the setting up of a concentrative Joint
Venture.XXXII

XXIX

XXX

Refer to note 28
Refer to: note 3, pg. 373-374.

XXXI

XXXII

Refer to: note 3, pg. 349.
Refer to: note 3, pg. 353.
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